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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CLAIMING JAIL
Paul E. Salamanca*
Most pari-mutuel horse races in the United States are
claiming races.' In such races, a track official stipulates a claim
price, and any authorized person may buy any horse that runs in
that race at that price.2 This device discourages owners from
running overqualified horses, which tends to ensure competitive
fields. Say, for example, an official set a price of $50,000 for a race.
An owner who ran a $60,000 horse in that race would stand a fair
chance of picking up a good part of the purse, but he or she would
also run a high risk of losing the horse to a claim for only five-sixths
of its value.3 Meanwhile, an owner who ran a $40,000 horse in that
same race would probably avoid a claim, but would also stand
relatively little chance of picking up much of the purse, thereby
wasting one of the horse's starts.4 Claiming races thus cause fields
to converge in quality, which tends to ensure competitive races. In
fact, claiming races have this effect even if people are unaware of
how they work, simply because people will see competitive races.
5
If people believe races are competitive, they will bet more,
6 which
* Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. I am
grateful to Chris Bradley, Zack Bray, Chris Frost, Brian Frye, John Garen, Henry Knight,
Ron Mitchell, Kathy Moore, Doug Richards, and Max Stearns for their comments on this
article. I was co-counsel to Jerry Jamgotchian in his petition for a writ of certiorari in
Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, 488 S.W.3d 594 (Ky. 2014), cert.
denied, 137 S.Ct. 493 (2016).
1 Christopher D. Hall, Market Enforced Information Asymmetry: A Study of
Claiming Races, 24 EcON. INQUIRY 271, 272 (1986).
2 See id. As Hall notes, "[tihis is a simplification. In some races, there are two or
more claim prices available to owners. ); id. n.3.
3 See J. Shannon Neibergs & Patrick L. Vinzant, Maximum Likelihood Estimates
of Racehorse Earnings and Profitability, 17 J. AGRIBUSINESS 37, 41 (1999) ("[A] higher
class horse running in a lower class race has a high probability of being claimed at a lower
[claiming price] than its potential; thus, the owner sacrifices terminal value and potential
future purse earnings."); Hall, supra note 1, at 274 ("[Wlhen the track offers sufficiently
large prizes, owners willingly enter horses worth more than the claim price. In anticipation
of finding bargain horses, claimers collect information on horse prices and qualities.").
I Id. at 39-41 (footnote omitted) ("Because of the very low probability of winning [a
purse] and [having a horse claimed], while sacrificing [a start], a horse is not raced at a
higher class than its ability.").
6 Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, 488 S.W.3d 594, 613 (Ky.
2014) ("The hope, reasonably borne out by centuries of experience, is that, generally at least,
the claiming rule will result in transparent, competitive races.").
6 Neibergs & Vinzant, supra note 3, at 38 n.2 ("The more even the field, the less
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will generate more revenue for the track. Moreover, to the extent
people do understand how claiming races work, they will be even
more inclined to see them as competitive, because they will
understand how the potential for claims monitors entries.7
From the perspective of many owners and claimants,
however, a claiming race is merely a sale with low transaction
costs, along with a chance for an owner to pick up part of a purse.
Most importantly, the price is preset. Second, claimants do not
have to travel from farm to farm to inspect horses. Instead, the
horses are brought to the track, and even paraded before the
race, allowing a brief inspection. Finally, claims are essentially
"as is" transactions, with few grounds for rescission.8 From this
perspective, claiming races present an opportunity to augment-
or reduce-one's table with the minimum of effort.9
This aspect of claiming races-a sale with low transaction
costs-would be especially significant, from a commercial point of
view, if horses were predictably worth more in one place than
another. This phenomenon would largely arise if purses were
variation in wagering odds between the horses most likely and least likely to win the race.
An even field improves parimutuel wagering, because one horse will not dominate wagering
patterns and the race results.").
7 See Hall, supra note 1, at 273 ("[Experts] advertise the honesty of races to bettors
by claiming horses. The elegance of the system lies in its ability to reveal information
obtained by experts whether or not they act on it directly."). Hall also argues that the
absence of claims can signal fraud, which will attract the track's attention. Assume, for
example, that a $50,000 claiming race with a field of eight typically yields two claims, often
for the same horse. Assume as well that an owner has surreptitiously switched a better
horse for a poorer one, say, a $75,000 horse for a $50,000 one. Ordinarily, insiders would
claim the horse, but difficulties arising from redocumenting a misdocumented horse would
quite likely deter them from doing so. From this, Hall concludes that a relative dearth of
claims may cause a track to investigate more closely. See id. at 275 ("To use a statistical
analogy, the track looks at the residual of their estimation for the number of horses claimed
in each race. Larger negative deviations signal increased probabilities of fraud."). Hall goes
on to argue that the threat of investigation, spurred by an absence of claims, itself acts to
deter fraud. See id.
8 See, e.g., Fattorusso v. Urbanowicz, 3 Misc. 3d 502, 504-05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004)
(citations omitted) ("With the exception of the misrepresentation as to age or sex, the only
other grounds for voiding a claim under the [New York] Racing and Wagering Board's
regulations is a positive test result for equine infectious anemia, a post-race blood or urine
sample that tests positive for the use of unauthorized substances, or an unreported
neuroectomy and an undisclosed pregnancy.").
9 Claiming races may also enable people to start a stable, or at least enter the
business. See, e.g., Colm Greaves, More Claiming Races Could Be Cure To Reduction in
Horse Ownership, IRISH EXAMINER (Jan. 9, 2016),
www.irishexaminer.com/sport/racing/more-claiming-races-could-be-cure-to-reduction-in-
horse-ownership-375255.html (describing the push for more claiming races in Ireland and
noting that claiming races create "liquidity ... at the bottom end of a market that tends to
be sluggish").
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predictably larger in one place than another. Assume, all other
things being equal (e.g., the quality of the horses), that purses in
State Y are predictably 20% higher than purses in State X. This
may be attributable to State Y having a larger betting population
or more wealth per capita than State X. Or it might be because
purses in State Y are enhanced by a public subsidy, or by proceeds
from casino gambling. Given the higher expected return per start
in State Y, horses would, on the whole, be worth more there than
in State X. This would create an incentive for entrepreneurs to
buy horses in State X and take them to State Y, until the meets
in State Y reached their capacity.10 This opportunity for arbitrage
between tracks, coupled with the low transaction costs of claiming
races, would present an attractive option for both claimants and
owners." In fact, low transaction costs could cause many owners,
particularly those who deal in small volumes, to rely heavily on
claiming races to dispose of their inventory.
12
For some owners, however, a claiming race might simply
substitute an undesirable "liability rule" for a preferred "property
rule."13 A comparison to eminent domain is apt. Assume my home
has a fair market value of $250,000. You offer to buy it from me
for that amount. Because a "property rule" ordinarily protects
property, I may refuse your offer and insist on more-not because
the market value of my property exceeds $250,000-by posit, it
does not-but because my subjective value in the property exceeds
that amount. If the government were to take my property by
eminent domain, however, I could not hold out for my subjective
price. Instead, assuming the government could show a "public
in In fact, the location of the larger purses could shift from time to time. This model
does not require vectors to be permanent, but merely predictable enough to encourage
arbitrage.
" See Neibergs & Vinzant, supra note 3, at 38 (noting that claiming races "provide
a racehorse market which allows investors to purchase/liquidate racehorse investments
12 Although the Law of One Price would seem to suggest that a horse's value would
be the same everywhere, the logistical cost of moving a horse to another state and racing (or
selling) it there could prove too high for many owners whose operations are limited in
geographic scope or volume. Unlike a smallvolume owner, an arbitrageur with operations
in many states could enjoy economies of scale with respect to logistical costs. See generally
Salem Rashid, The "Law" of One Price: Implausible Yet Consequential, 10 Q. J. AUSTRIAN
ECON. 79, 84 (2007) (describing the challenges of arbitraging between two stores with
different prices for rice).
' See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View ofthe Cathedral, 85 HARv. L.REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (noting "three
types of entitlements-entitlements protected by property rules, entitlements protected by
liability rules, and inalienable entitlements").
37
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purpose" for the taking,14 a court would condemn my land and the
government would be liable to me for its fair market value, which
is $250,000. A "liability rule" would thus replace a "property rule."
A claiming race might operate similarly, albeit without quite the
coercive aspect of eminent domain. If a track sets a claim price for
a race at $50,000, and I enter my horse in that race, then you may
buy my horse at that price, independent of whatever subjective
value I may attach to it. I do retain the option of not entering my
horse in a claiming race at all, but my horse would stand little
chance of earning money if I withheld it from claiming races.
As a strictly commercial matter, of course, rational
owners would want to sell their horses at market price. To the
extent commercial considerations control, they would not object
to losing their horses in claiming races. On the other hand,
commercial considerations might not control. More particularly,
owners might prefer to keep their horses, if the subjective value
they attach to them exceeds their market value. That is, they
might prefer to "leave money on the table" in exchange for the
utility of continuing to own a horse. The evidence is substantial
that many people enter the horse industry not to make money,
but as a hobby. For them, a sale at market price would not be
ideal, because market price would not capture the subjective
value they attach to their horses.
We can thus see the dilemma that such owners face. They
want to enter their horses in claiming races, because most races
are claiming races, and the only way to win money in a claiming
race is to enter it. But such races can trigger sales at something
approximating market price. This puts them in a bind. If they
try to preserve the subjective value of their horses by running
them in races for which they are demonstrably underqualified,
they will see inadequate return. If they seek return, however, by
running their horses in races for which they are qualified, their
horses may be claimed at something approximating market
price, and they will lose their subjective value.
Finally, for purposes of this paper, we can consider
claiming races from tracks' perspectives. Tracks want as many
horses as possible at their meets. Specifically, they want
relatively large fields, a large number of races per day, and they
want horses to be sorted-one way or another-into fields of
' See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
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roughly even quality. For tracks, claiming races consequently
present something of a double-edged sword: a seemingly effective
and inexpensive way to ensure even fields, but also a device that
enables arbitrageurs to raid stables if purses are consistently
larger somewhere else.
Enter claiming jail, which appears to respond to-and
thus confirm-this dynamic of arbitrage. Of the approximately
thirty-eight states that allow parimutuel horse racing,
15
approximately twenty-seven impose this restriction.16 Under this
rule, an individual who claims a horse is precluded from taking
the horse to another track, or another state, for a certain period
of time. Section (b) of Kentucky's "Article 6," for example, provides
that:
Unless the stewards grant permission for a claimed
horse to enter and start at an overlapping or
conflicting meeting in Kentucky, a horse shall not
race elsewhere until the close of entries in the
meeting at which it was claimed.17
In other words, if a person claims a horse in Kentucky, he or she
may not race it outside the Commonwealth for the duration of the
meet at which the claim was made.
We can fairly easily see how claiming jails would protect
tracks from arbitrage, and, perhaps, owners who attach a high
subjective value to their horses. By forbidding claimants to run a
claimed horse outside a meet, rules like Article 6 tend to ensure
that a track's stables will remain full, regardless if the impetus
to buy horses and take them elsewhere is strong.
And, not surprisingly, tracks typically defend claiming jail
in precisely these terms. In Jacobson v. Maryland Racing
Commission,18 for example, a steward testified that, because of
entrepreneurial activity, some of their very best Maryland breds
were being claimed and that they were being raided, that these
horses were going out of our state which, in effect, would have
some economic impact on racing in Maryland, because we were
15 See Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, 488 S.W.3d 594, 599
(Ky. 2014).
16 See id. at 614 n.13.
17 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS.1:015, §1(6)(b) (2007).
'8Jacobson v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 274 A.2d 102 (Md. 1971).
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losing our better Maryland bred horses, and as you undoubtedly
know ... the handle [the amount of money bet daily on the races
at a meet] will vary with the quality of the horses that are run at
the race meeting.19
Similarly, the president of Churchill Downs, in support of a
more aggressive version of Article 6 in Kentucky, reportedly "cited
the number of horses claimed at the Keeneland spring meet and
the current Churchill meet that ran back at tracks outside
Kentucky as examples of how the present claiming game restricts
field sizes in the Bluegrass state."20 "It's hard for us to watch other
states pass rules," he said, "where they are guarding the horses in
their state so people don't go and claim them and run them in
other places .... We've got to do something about it to assist the
field sizes."21
Claiming jail may also protect owners' subjective
valuation of horses, to the extent it raises the opportunity cost of
claiming a horse. If an entrepreneur claimed a horse at a track
with meager purses, but had to run the horse at that track for
the duration of the meet because of claiming jail, he or she would
lose the additional expected return from larger purses
elsewhere. At the margin, this would have a dampening effect on
demand for horses in claiming races at that track, shifting the
demand curve downward and to the left for would-be claimants.22
This would provide some measure of protection to owners who do
not want their horses claimed. Of course, this same dynamic
would actually hurt owners who seek to liquidate their
inventories in claiming races, by depressing demand.
It would be difficult not to see interference with interstate
commerce in the concept of claiming jail. A rule like Article 6
draws a line (around the track, or at a state's borders) and hoards
a benefit (i.e., access to the claimed horse for the purpose of
racing).23
It is therefore identical in concept to innumerable
" Jacobson, 274 A.2d at 104-05 (brackets and ellipses original).
20 Ron Mitchell, Draft Claiming, Scratch Rules Approved by Kentucky Authority,
BLOODHORSE (June 19, 2007), https://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-
racing/articles/159457/draft-claiming-scratch-rules-approved-by-kentucky-authority.
21 Id. (quoting Steve Sexton, president of Churchill Downs) (internal quotations
removed).
22 See GREGORY N. MANKVIEW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 71 (6th ed.
2012) ("[Mlarket demand depends on the number of ... buyers.").
23 To put the matter in economic terms, claiming jail would depress the
arbitrageurs' function of re-allocating horses in proportion to purse size.
2017-20181 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CLAIMING JAIL
restrictions that courts have subjected to close scrutiny for their
discriminatory treatment of interstate commerce. In fact, even if
a state like Kentucky has a non-protectionist justification for a
rule like Article 6, as Justice Stewart noted in Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative
means as well as legislative ends."24 To exclude the possibility
that a rule's explicitly discriminatory means have been chosen
to serve discriminatory ends, courts will typically ask whether it
serves a legitimate (non-protectionist) purpose, and whether the
state lacks a reasonable non-discriminatory alternative.
Upon examination, however, these rules seem to lack non-
protectionist rationales. Indeed, the evidence seems replete that
states adopt them precisely to protect tracks from raiding (and
perhaps some owners as well).25 To be sure, raiding appears to be
an inevitable byproduct of: (1) claiming races, which are virtually
unavoidable in parimutuel horse racing; and (2) substantial
variations in purse sizes, which predictably arise from various
economic, political, demographic, and geographic factors. But
claiming races and claiming jail do not have to coexist. States are
often mismatched in terms of natural or economic advantages, but
the Supreme Court has largely, if not universally, rejected
attempts by states to sequester their resources, in the interest of
promoting a national economy. Thus, to defend rules like Article 6
against attack, states need to explain the necessity of claiming jail,
not claiming races.
In a world without claiming jail, arbitrageurs quite likely
would raid tracks with relatively small purses, until tracks with
relatively large purses reached their fill of horses. At that point,
the market would find a new equilibrium. The best horses would
be allocated to the best purses, and so on, down the line. The
demand curve for horses in claiming races at tracks with
relatively small purses would shift back upward and to the right,
returning to where it would be in the absence of the added cost of
claiming jail. As part of this new equilibrium, horses appropriate
to the purses in any given state would race in that state.
Arbitrage would continue, but only as a function of economies of
scale.26 The market would work, and the Balkanization would
end.
24 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (emphasis added).
25 See generally supra notes 18-2 1(including the accompanying text).
26 See supra note 12.
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It is an interesting question, however, as to whether tracks
would adopt claiming jail on their own-that is, make it a
condition of running horses there.27 Purely private policies would
not implicate the Commerce Clause. If owners on the whole
wanted to sell their horses in claiming races, they would try to
avoid tracks with claiming jail, to avoid any distortions to the
demand curve that it might cause. Tracks might defend their
policy on the ground that they should be compensated, through
the device of claiming jail, for facilitating sales with low
transaction costs. In response, owners might argue that they do
compensate tracks for performing this service, by bringing their
horses to the track to race.
Notwithstanding claiming jail's fairly obvious interference
with interstate commerce, attacks on the device have had mixed
success in the courts. In Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing
Commission,28 for example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
upheld Kentucky's version of claiming jail against constitutional
attack, classifying Article 6 as "not protectionist in intent,"29 and
declining to decouple claiming races from claiming jail. In other
words, the Court insisted that protecting tracks from the
vulnerability that claiming races create cannot practically be
separated from claiming races themselves. As Justice Hughes
wrote for a unanimous Court:
[T1he Commission has compelling reasons-racing
integrity reasons, if you will-that have nothing to
do with Kentucky tracks' competition with out-of-
state businesses for adopting some form of claiming
27 In California, which currently does not have a public version of claiming jail, at
least one track is reported to have a private one. See Jeremy Balan, CHRB Discusses 'Jail-
Time' Claiming Rule Change, BLOODHORSE (July 20, 2017)
https://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racingarticles/22267 1/chrb-discusses-jail-time-claiming-
rule-change ("Del Mar has a house rule (45-day wait period or the end of the meet), and
Santa Anita racing secretary Rick Hammerle said the Arcadia track will work to install a
similar house rule for its fall meet to keep the circuit's rules consistent ."). Nevertheless, the
California Horse Racing Board (CHRB) appears to support a public rule. See id. (quoting
CHRB spokesman Mike Marten) ("'A house rule can take action (with) stabling privileges
when they come around again, but ... there is much greater authority in a (CHRB) rule than
a house rule,' Marten said. 'It has a longer reach than a house rule."').2 8 Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 488 S.W.3d 594 (Ky. 2014).
2 Id. at 615; see also id. at 605 n.7 (describing "Article 6's 'discrimination' against
out- of-state racetracks" as "more apparent than real"); id. at 610 ("Notwithstanding a
modicum of discrimination, Article 6 is part of a larger, non-discriminatory racing
regulation, not a trade regulation .... ").
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rule that balances the risks/rewards to owners and
potential purchasers, and thus has independent
reason for as efficient a rule as experience with it
can devise.30
As suggested above, this horse quite likely will not run.
The majority of parimutuel horse races must likely be claiming
races, but claiming jail simply protects tracks-and perhaps
some owners-from the threat of competition from tracks with
larger purses elsewhere. Such an economic discrepancy can no
more justify claiming jail than a state's advantage in producing
a commodity at low cost can justify a tariff against that state's
products.31
In support of its approach, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky differentiated, or attempted to differentiate, between
two types of claimants: (1) those who merely want to serve as a
monitor on opportunistic behavior; and (2) those who want to
augment their inventory.32 "The claiming rule's overbreadth,"
wrote Justice Hughes, "means that the claiming rule itself is
subject to 'abuse' by claimants who take advantage of it to claim
not just patently and inappropriately valued horses, but other
horses as well." 3 3
One might, perhaps, illustrate this point as follows.
Imagine that a $50,000 horse ran in a $40,000 claiming race, and
someone claimed it. That claim, according to Justice Hughes,
would not be "abusive," because the horse was in fact worth more
than the claim price. Now imagine that a $40,000 horse ran in
the same race, and someone claimed it. According to Justice
Hughes, that claim would be "abusive," even if that same horse
would be worth $50,000 in a state with larger purses.
3 Jam gotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 615. For an opinion upholding Pennsylvania's
claiming jail against constitutional attack, see Jamgotchian v. State Horse Racing Comm'n,
269 F.Supp.3d 604, 616 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (applying the test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("The burden on commerce, if any, is incidental and reasonably
restrained to benefit the local horse racing industry.")). The Pike test is ordinarily reserved
for laws that do not discriminate against interstate commerce, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 461 (5th ed. 2015), and would therefore
seem inappropriate as a test for claiming jail. Cf Jacobson v. Maryland Racing
Commission, 274 A.2d 102, 107 (Md. 1971) (upholding Maryland's claiming jail against
attack on grounds that it violated due process).
1' See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); West Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
32See Jam gotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 613.
33 Id.
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Justice Hughes' argument has strong intuitive appeal,
but it suffers from two significant flaws. First, it does not so
much disprove protectionism as identify the class of individuals
against whom the rule is intended to operate. Second, and
perhaps more fundamentally, it assumes that an inherently
mercenary device like claiming races will operate effectively if
mercenary motives are muted. Analysis would appear to suggest,
however, that the device would work less well to the extent
demand were artificially suppressed.
Although the Supreme Court of the United States denied
review in Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana recently struck down Indiana's version of claiming jail
in another action brought by the same individual.34
The court's analysis on the question of interference with
interstate commerce was brief, but nevertheless emphatic:
Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the
Defendants have not shown that [Indiana's claiming
jail] advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot
adequately be served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives. Rather, they
evince the type of economic protectionism that the
dormant Commerce Clause is designed to prevent.35
If Indiana appeals this decision, we should see this issue in the
Seventh Circuit before long.3 6
" See Jamgotchian v. Indiana Horse Racing Comm'n, No. 1: 16-cv-2344-WTL-TAB,
slip op. at 7 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 2017). Query whether the non-existence of claiming jail in
Indiana (at least for now) will encourage owners in Kentucky to enter their horses in
claiming races there, instead of in Kentucky, which retains claiming jail (at least for now).
As noted earlier, if owners on the whole wanted to sell their horses in claiming races, they
would try to avoid tracks with claiming jail.
' Id., slip op. at 6-7.
36 In 2003, the Attorney General of California rendered an opinion that tends to
suggest that claiming jail violates the federal Constitution. See Letter from Bill Lockyer to
Roy C. Wood, Jr., Executive Director of the California Horse Racing Board (Sept. 8, 2003).
Although California subsequently withdrew its claiming jail rules, it appears to be
contemplating their reinstatement. See Balan, supra note 27.
